Sheila Dow, Matthias Klaes and Alberto Montagnoli focus on “Variety of economic judgement and monetary policy-making by committee”. They argue that with increasing attention being given to how monetary policy is communicated has come a focus on the scope for diverse messages to arise from the committee making the decision. The existing literature sees the source of such diversity in relation to a correct decision based on one true model, such that diversity is an indicator of uncertainty within the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and in turn causes uncertainty in markets. The authors explore the implications of diversity as being instead the norm within a pluralist approach to knowledge. Each member’s judgement may differ, but may be held with a low degree of uncertainty; alternatively the committee may agree on a high degree of uncertainty. In other words there is no necessary correspondence between variety of judgement and uncertainty. By considering judgement as the core of decision-making and uncertainty as conditioning judgement, Dow, Klaes and Montagnoli use this approach to develop a theory of decision-making by committee under uncertainty. Their case study is the MPC of the Bank of England. The authors conclude with a hypothesis about the tendency to policy inaction in different circumstances, notably where there are confident but conflicting judgements within the committee, on the one hand, and where there is agreement that a high level of uncertainty clouds judgement, on the other.